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Abstract 
 
Large scale tracking policies, allowing academically apt pupils to enter a select group of secondary 
schools, can be found in many Sub-Saharan countries. However, evidence on the impact of these 
policies on school outcomes, especially school participation, is limited. This paper fills this gap by 
providing regression discontinuity evidence on the impact of Malawi’s tracking program. The 
analysis is based on unique institutional data covering an entire cohort of pupils. Estimates show 
that Malawi’s tracking program raises school participation of top students without a reduction in 
pupil learning. These findings have implications for education policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The education sectors of most Sub-Saharan countries face chronic shortages in physical and 
human resources. Rather than distributing the limited resources available for secondary education 
uniformly across schools, many governments allocate a relatively large share of the available 
resources to a select number of secondary schools. Admission to these schools is typically merit-
based and determined on the basis of an exam. Examples of such tracking policies can be found in, 
for instance, Botswana, Chad, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda.3
Malawi's public secondary schools can be divided into 2 main categories: conventional 
schools and community day schools. Conventional schools are universally favored by parents and 
pupils. Disparities between conventional schools and community day schools in terms of physical 
and human resources are large. Together these two categories of public secondary schools can 
accommodate approximately 40% of the 100,000 pupils who annually successfully complete the 
primary school exam. 
 Presumably, 
these policies are in place to ensure that annually at least a minimum number of relatively well-
educated individuals enter tertiary education or the labor force. Although they are common, little is 
known about the effectiveness of these policies. This paper attempts to fill this gap by investigating 
the impact of the tracking policy employed in Malawi’s secondary schools on school outcomes.  
Pupils are selected into a fixed number of places available in these 2 categories of secondary 
schools based on their performance on the Primary School Leaving Certificate Examination 
(PSLCE). The top performers on the PSLCE are selected into conventional schools. Second tier 
performers on the PSLCE are selected into community day schools. Third tier performers are not 
selected into public secondary schools. They either drop out or enter private secondary schools, 
                                                             
3 As can be inferred from http://education.stateuniversity.com 
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which are generally poorly equipped and scantly staffed institutions even in comparison to 
community day schools. By selecting pupils into specific community day schools and conventional 
schools, the Ministry of Education not only severely restricts school choice between, but also within 
these two school types. 
Selection into a conventional school is a multidimensional treatment, as pupils who are 
selected into conventional schools enter better endowed schools and are surrounded by a select peer 
group. This paper exploits the restricted school choice between community day schools and 
conventional schools, which can be interpreted as an application of the regression discontinuity 
design, to identify the impact of this multidimensional treatment on pupil learning and pupil 
retention.4
The analysis is based on unique data that cover an entire cohort of students who took the 
PSLCE at the end of 2004 and were selected to enter a community day school or conventional 
school at the start of 2005. I linked the 2004 PSLCE scores of these pupils to their performance on 
the 2006 junior certificate examination (JCE), an exam that all students must take at the end of their 
second year in secondary school. Looking at an entire cohort of pupils has the advantage that the 
relevance of the analysis is not reduced by external validity concerns. 
 The main idea being that pupils with a PSLCE score just below the cutoff for selection 
into a conventional school serve as a valid counterfactual for pupils with a PSLCE just above the 
cutoff as they are in principle comparable in terms of unobserved characteristics. 
The regression discontinuity estimates show that the tracking procedure effectively raises 
school outcomes of pupils selected into conventional secondary schools. First, pupil retention rates 
(as measured by the fraction of pupils participating in the JCE) are roughly 50% higher in                                                              
4 This paper refers to the ability of schools to keep pupils in school and to make sure that they progress 
through the system as "retention". Retention never refers to the act of making a pupil repeat a grade. 
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conventional secondary schools. Second, a bounds analysis shows that pupil learning in conventional 
schools (as measured by performance on the JCE) is at least equal to, but possibly markedly higher 
than pupil learning in community day schools.  
These outcomes provide the first evidence on the impact of large scale tracking across 
schools in Sub-Saharan Africa on pupil retention. This evidence can serve as a valuable input for 
policy makers in Sub-Saharan Africa when they evaluate their tracking policies. The evidence is also 
highly relevant for parents and pupils, as it tells them why it matters for pupils to get into a good 
secondary school. 
In addition, the outcomes serve as a more general indication that the school environment (a 
combination of school characteristics and peers) matters for pupil retention in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Prior evidence for this intuitively appealing proposition is limited, because self-selection issues tend 
to hinder clean identification (Glewwe 2002; Glewwe and Kremer 2006). Two studies on South-
Africa and India, respectively based on a natural experiment and a field experiment, suggest that the 
teacher to pupil ratio, an important measure of school quality, may affect school participation 
(Banerjee et al. 2000; Case and Deaton 1999). Randomized experiments in Kenya, on the other 
hand, show no detectable relationship between inputs like textbooks and school participation (e.g. 
Glewwe et al. 2000). 
The evidence for the role played by the school environment in pupil learning is more 
abundant. Duflo et al. (2008), for instance, show that a tracking experiment within schools in Kenya 
positively affected learning of pupils across all levels of the ability distribution. Similarly, Banerjee et 
al. (2007) found that remedial education and computer assisted learning had a positive impact on 
pupil learning, because pupils could work at their own ability level. The literature on peer effects 
substantiates the finding that peers matter for pupil learning (e.g. Hoxby 2000; Sacerdote 2001; 
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Zimmerman 2003; Ding and Lehrer 2007; Lyle 2007; Lavy et al 2008). And teachers have also been 
shown to play an important role in pupil learning (e.g. Angrist and Lavy 1999; Rivkin et al. 2005). 
The results on pupil learning presented in this paper, although estimated with wide bounds, are in 
accordance with this body of evidence. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some background on 
the education sector in Malawi. Section 3 discusses the methodology. Section 4 describes the data. 
Section 5 presents the main results. Section 6 discusses the validity of the methodology and the 
robustness of the results. Section 7 concludes. 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 BASIC FACTS 
Malawi is a relatively small landlocked country in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2005, the year in 
which the cohort under consideration entered secondary school, it had almost 14 million 
inhabitants. Due to high birth and mortality rates a high proportion of Malawi's population is of 
primary or secondary school age. According to the Ministry of Education (2005) there were 
approximately 2.5 million children of primary school age and 1 million children of secondary school 
age in 2005. 
Basic education in Malawi consists of 8 years of primary education (standard 1 through 8) 
and 4 years of secondary education (Form 1 through 4). All primary and all secondary schools offer 
the same curriculum, the contents of which are determined by the Ministry of Education.  
2.2 PRIMARY EDUCATION IN MALAWI 
For most Malawians access to formal primary and especially secondary education was limited 
under British colonial rule which ended in 1964. A first attempt to increase access to primary 
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education was made under the one-party regime of President Banda, who seized control after 
Malawi gained independence. However, it was not until the first democratically elected government 
of Malawi came into power in 1994 that primary school fees were abolished (virtually overnight) and 
primary school became accessible to Malawians of all backgrounds. According to Al-Samarrai and 
Zaman (2007) the abolition of primary school fees resulted in a surge in enrolment from 1.9 million 
students in 1994 to an all-time high of 2.9 million students in 1999. 
The expansion of access to primary schools evidently improved the equity of Malawi's 
primary education system. UNDP estimates that in 2005 Malawi had a net primary enrollment rate 
of 95%.5
2.3 SECONDARY EDUCATION IN MALAWI 
 At the same time, expanded access inevitably posed and continues to pose a challenge to 
the quality of primary education as many primary schools have to cope with shortages of nearly all 
physical and human resources. 
Education policy in Malawi has primarily focused on improved access to primary education 
over the past half a century. The resulting expansion of access to primary education, especially in the 
period after 1994, has put the secondary education system under pressure as the numbers of primary 
school graduates wishing to attend secondary school have soared. Compared to the primary 
education system, the capacity of the secondary school system is limited and, at 24%, the 2005 net 
secondary enrolment rate was among the lowest enrolment rates in the world.6
Traditionally, the bulk of secondary education in Malawi was provided in a group of elitist 
secondary schools, generally referred to as conventional schools. The conventional schools can be 
subdivided into 24 national boarding schools, 41 district boarding schools, and 52 district day 
 
                                                             
5 See the Human Development Report country statistics for Malawi: 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_MWI.html. 
6 See footnote 5. 
7  
schools. National boarding schools are considered to be the best conventional schools and serve 
pupils from the entire country. District boarding schools are considered to be the next best group of 
conventional schools and serve only pupils attending primary schools in the same district. District 
day schools serve only pupils who live within commutable distance from the school. 
To increase access to secondary education beyond that provided in conventional schools at a 
limited cost, the Banda government started to provide secondary education in so-called "distance 
education centers", which later came to be known as community day schools. The government, in 
cooperation with various donor organizations and the African Development Bank, is working to get 
the quality of community day schools up to par with conventional schools. 
Despite the government's efforts to improve the quality of the community day schools, 
significant disparities in terms of physical and human resources persist, as illustrated by table 1. The 
table shows that, on average, conventional schools are bigger than community day schools and the 
disparities in available physical and human resources are large. Community day schools do 
somewhat better in terms of teacher to pupil ratios, but this result is reversed when teacher 
education is taken into account. In conventional schools nearly all teachers have obtained a degree 
beyond the Malawi School Certificate Examination (the MSCE is the degree obtained upon 
successful completion of secondary school). In community day schools only 1 in 6 teachers has 
obtained a degree beyond MSCE. Basic physical resources are often lacking in community day 
schools, while they are available in most conventional schools. Differences in availability of libraries, 
toilets, and electricity are particularly striking. Conventional schools can, on average, provide each 
pupil with a book for Chichewa, English, and mathematics, while books for these subjects have to 
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be shared among 2 pupils in community day schools. 7
Table 2 shows that the differences in physical and human resources between day and 
boarding conventional school are not nearly as pronounced. Differences in the teacher pupil ratio 
and educated teacher pupil ratio are no longer significant. Significant differences in most of the 
physical resources are present, but they are an order of magnitude smaller than differences between 
community day school and conventional school. 
 These differences do not translate into 
significantly higher school fees in conventional secondary schools, as school fees are capped by 
government regulation. 
The government of Malawi currently primarily attempts to increase access to formal public 
education by increasing the number of community day schools. The number of conventional 
schools, on the other hand, is more or less stagnant. Despite the efforts made by the government to 
expand access to public secondary education, the surge in primary school graduates in the 1990s 
could not be fully absorbed by the formal public institutions for secondary education (community 
day schools and conventional schools). As a result private secondary schools mushroomed over the 
past 15 years. 
Private secondary schools cannot be treated as a homogenous group, because they exhibit 
vast differences in terms of quality and fees. Some private schools provide expensive and high 
quality education to privileged inhabitants of Malawi's cities. However, the vast majority of private 
schools are poorly equipped and scantly staffed institutions even in comparison to community day 
schools. They cater to the average Malawian pupil who was not selected into a community day 
school or conventional school, and do so at the lowest possible cost. Many private schools are not 
officially registered or regulated, do not function as exam centers (their pupils have to sit for exams                                                              
7 Although conventional schools compare favorably to community day schools, they would still be considered to be 
unacceptably poorly equipped schools in any western country. 
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as external candidates at schools that do function as exam centers), and the government knows little 
about the quality of these schools. In general, unless they can afford to attend fancy upper class 
private schools, students will prefer to enroll into a community day school or conventional school. 
2.4 EXAMINATION 
    Student performance in primary school is assessed based on the PSLCE. The PSLCE tests 
pupils on 5 subjects: Chichewa, English, mathematics, science, and social studies. Secondary 
education in Malawi consists of four years of schooling divided into a two-year junior cycle and a 
two-year senior cycle. Student performance in these two cycles is assessed on the basis of the JCE 
and the MSCE respectively. In the JCE and MSCE students are tested on a subset of 24 course 
subjects. 
The PSLCE, JCE, and MSCE are standardized national exams set and marked by the 
Ministry of Education and the Malawi National Examinations Board. Besides the grades for 
individual courses, the Examinations Board also awards students an overall “pass” or “fail” based on 
the aggregate score of the course subjects examined. 
2.5 SELECTION PROCEDURES 
The Malawi National Examinations Board exam data show that in 2004 there were 150,748 
pupils who sat for the PSLCE out of which 94,789 passed. The ministry of education was able to 
provide 39,090 of the pupils who passed the PSLCE a spot in one of the public secondary schools 
(community day schools or conventional schools) for the 2005 school year: 11,900 in conventional 
schools and 27,190 in community day schools. Because the number of primary school graduates 
surpasses the number of available spots in public secondary schools the Ministry of Education 
employs a merit based selection system that uses performance on the PSLCE as a selection criterion. 
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With this system the ministry of education ensures that the top performers on the PSLCE are able 
to attend the top secondary schools. 
Selection into Form 1 (the first grade of secondary school) is conducted by a team of 
officials from the Ministry of Education and the Division Education Offices (henceforth the 
selection team). The selection is based on pupils' aggregate scores on the PSLCE. On each of the 
five course subjects examined in the PSLCE pupils can score a total of 100 points maximum. A 
pupil's aggregate PSLCE score is the sum of the scores on his/her 4 best subjects. This subsection 
describes the official selection procedures applied by the selection team. Appendix 2 provides 
additional details on the selection procedure. 
The procedures for selection into public secondary schools can be separated into four 
subcategories: the three types of conventional school (national boarding schools, district boarding 
schools, and district day schools) and community day school. Each school can accommodate a fixed 
number of boys and a fixed number of girls annually and the selection team bases its selection on 
this number of available places. 
National boarding schools 
    For selection into Form 1 of national boarding schools, pupils are stratified by gender and 
then selected based on merit. In 2005, for instance, the national boarding schools were able to 
accommodate 718 male and 773 female pupils. The MOE ranked all male and female students 
according to their aggregate PSLCE scores and then selected the top 718 male students and the top 
773 female students into national boarding school. 
The selection team also decides which specific national boarding school each of the selected 
pupils can enter. This decision is based on the distance of each pupil's primary school to the national 
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boarding schools. As much as possible, the selection team selects pupils into the national boarding 
school closest to their primary school. 
District boarding schools 
For organizational purposes the ministry of education divides Malawi into 33 education 
districts. Of the 33 districts, 29 have district boarding schools, which are only accessible to students 
who took the PSLCE in the district. Similar to the selection into national boarding schools, pupils 
are stratified by gender and then selected into the district boarding schools based on merit. 
If there are multiple district boarding schools in a district the selection team decides which 
specific district boarding school a pupil can attend. To do so, pupils are ranked according to 
aggregate performance within their gender group and then distributed across the district boarding 
schools in groups of three in descending order.8
This procedure ensures that pupil performance on the PSLCE is balanced across district 
boarding schools. 
 
District day schools 
District day schools do not provide boarding facilities and pupils have to commute (usually 
walk) to these schools on a daily basis. It is therefore important that pupils are selected into district 
day schools located within a reasonable distance from their home village. 
    To ensure that pupils are only selected into nearby district day schools, the selection team 
selects pupils for each district day school only from so-called feeder schools. Feeder schools are 
                                                             
8 Suppose, for instance, that there are three District Boarding Schools: A, B, and C. The selection team then selects the 
first three pupils on the list to go to District Boarding School A, the next three pupils to go to District Boarding School 
B, the next three pupils to go to District Boarding School C, the next three pupils to go to District Boarding School A 
etc. 
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primary schools within commutable distance from the district day school. Pupils who took their 
PSLCE in a feeder school belonging to a district day school are again stratified by gender and then 
selected into the corresponding district boarding schools based on merit. 
Community day secondary schools 
   Finally, the selection team selects pupils into community day schools. Similar to 
conventional school, the number of male and female pupils who can enter community day schools is 
fixed. The procedure used to select pupils into community day schools is equivalent to the 
procedure used for district day secondary schools. 
Cutoff points 
    The number of available places in each school type and the performance of the pupils on 
the PSLCE together implicitly determine cutoff points in the PSLCE (which differ for boys and 
girls) to make it into each school type: 
1. A national cutoff point to make it into national boarding school; 
2. A cutoff point that differs per district to make it into district boarding school; 
3. A cutoff point that differs per district day school to make it into district day school; 
4. A cutoff point that differs per community day school to make it into community day school. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 ESTIMATION 
The selection procedure described in the previous section can be interpreted as an 
application of the regression discontinuity design, which was first introduced by Thistlethwaite and 
Campbell (1960) and formalized by Hahn et al. (2001). The regression discontinuity design exploits 
the observed jump in the probability of being selected into a conventional school to estimate the 
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causal effect of selection on school outcomes. It basically does so by comparing pupils with a 
PSLCE score right below the cutoff score to those with a PSLCE score right above the cutoff. The 
identifying assumption is that pupils with a PSLCE score right below the cutoff point are 
comparable to pupils with an exam score right above the cutoff and thus serve as a valid 
counterfactual. 
Consistent estimation of the treatment effect at the cutoff point requires a correct 
specification of the relationship between the forcing variable (the PSLCE score) and the outcome of 
interest. I follow the recent empirical regression discontinuity literature and approximate this 
relationship with a low order polynomial. See Matsudaira (2008) and Clark (2009) for recent 
applications of this parametric RD approach in the economics of education literature. See Imbens 
and Lemieux (2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2009) for in-depth “how-to” guides.  
Formally, I estimate the following relationship: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑘𝑘 +𝑘𝑘 ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑘𝑘 +𝑘𝑘 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 , 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖  is the schooling outcome of interest (e.g. passing the JCE) for pupil i. 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  is a dummy that 
takes the value 1 if pupil i was selected into a conventional school. The term ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘  is a 
polynomial of order k that estimates the relationship between the outcome of interest and the 
distance of a pupil’s PSLCE score 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  (the forcing variable) to the cutoff score c. The term 
∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘  includes 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 , a dummy that takes the value 1 if a pupil’s exam score exceeds the 
cutoff point c, and thus allows for a different functional form of the polynomial above and below 
the cutoff score. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  captures all other determinants of passing the JCE. As I will show in the results 
section, the selection procedures are executed with some imprecision. I therefore apply the so-called 
“fuzzy” version of the regression discontinuity design, which accommodates for imprecise selection 
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by instrumenting for selection into a conventional school (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖) with having an exam score beyond 
the cutoff score (𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖). 
 The coefficient 𝛽𝛽  gives the intent-to-treat effect – the effect of being selected into a 
conventional secondary school. An attractive feature of the regression discontinuity design is that 
this treatment effect can not only be estimated econometrically, but also conveyed graphically. 
3.2 MULTIPLE CUTOFF POINTS 
A limitation of the standard regression discontinuity design with only 1 cutoff point is that it 
provides only a local estimate of the treatment effect. The selection into conventional school differs 
from the standard regression discontinuity design, as there are geographic differences in the cutoff 
point. Differences in the cutoff points across districts provide a rare opportunity to estimate an 
average treatment effect over a range of the PSLCE scores. I follow the terminology of Black et al. 
(2005), who also investigate a situation with multiple cutoff points, and call each group of pupils 
facing the same cutoff point (e.g. all pupils in feeder schools for the same district day school) a 
regression discontinuity group. I pool the data from all different regression discontinuity groups and 
estimate the model described above, with the inclusion of dummies for all regression discontinuity 
groups to capture fixed effects. 
4. DATA 
This paper is based on data extracted from five institutional databases: the 2004 PSLCE 
scores, the 2006 JCE scores, the 2005 Form 1 selection, and the 2005 and 2006 Education 
Management Information System (EMIS). 9
                                                             
9 The data were kindly provided by Malawi's Ministry of Education and the Malawi National Examinations Board. 
 The 2004 PSLCE scores and the 2006 JCE scores 
contain personal information (student number, name, and gender), information on the exam center 
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(name, district, type), and exam information (scores on individual subjects on a scale of 1-10010
It is fairly straightforward to link most of these datasets on unique identifying variables. The 
2005 Form 1 selection data, for instance, can be matched to the 2004 PSLCE data on the basis of a 
unique student id. Similarly, the EMIS data can be matched to the exam data based on school name, 
school location and school type. 
, 
aggregate scores, and overall pass/fail) for each pupil. The 2005 selection data contain personal 
information for each pupil who was selected into a public secondary school (student number, name, 
and gender) and information on the school these pupils have been selected into (name, district, and 
type). The 2005 and 2006 EMIS data contain a wide range of school specific information including 
physical and human resources. 
However, linking the exam scores for individual students across different time periods 
requires a more involved matching procedure. The 2006 JCE data contain three identifying variables 
for each pupil: secondary school attended by the pupil, pupil gender, and pupil name. After merging 
with the 2005 Form 1 selection data, the 2004 data contain these same three identifying variables.11
To deal with the issue of differently spelled names I applied an “approximate string 
matching procedure”. I have been conservative in my procedure to accept approximate string 
matches and checked all approximate string matches manually. A detailed description of this string 
matching procedure can be found in appendix 1. It is of importance to emphasize that the available 
data and variables are equivalent for community day schools and conventional schools and come 
 
Nevertheless, for many of pupils, an exact match on these three identifying variables is impossible 
because of differences in the spelling of their names across different years. 
                                                             
10 Pupils themselves never see the 1-100 scores. Instead the scores on the 1-100 scale are converted to abc grades, which 
are presented to the pupils. 
11 There is one important distinction though: whereas the 2006 JCE data contain the secondary school actually attended 
by the student, the 2004 PSLCE data contain the secondary school that a pupil was selected into by the MOE. 
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from the same datasets. As a result the matching procedure is identical for pupils selected into 
community day schools and conventional schools. 
5. RESULTS 
5.1 SELECTION INTO FORM 1 
The 2004 PSLCE Exam Scores and the official selection procedures described can be used 
to reconstruct the selection into form 1 for the 2005 school-year. In this section I graphically 
compare these reconstructed selection results to the selection conducted by the selection team to 
gain insight into the precision with which the selection team executes its own selection procedures. 
Figs. 1a and 1b compare the actual results for selection into form 1 of a conventional school 
(national boarding school, district boarding school, or district day school) in 2005 to the 
reconstructed selection results for boys and girls respectively. As described, the cutoff point for 
selection into a conventional school differs per district and even within districts. To investigate the 
average precision of the selection procedure (rather than the precision at each individual cutoff 
point) all PSLCE scores are centered in figs. 1a and 1b such that they take the value zero at the 
cutoff point. 
The scores on the horizontal axis indicate the distance of the aggregate PSLCE scores to the 
cutoff point in the aggregate PSLCE scores. Negative scores indicate the extent to which the 
aggregate PSLCE score falls short of the cutoff point in standard deviations and vice versa for 
positive scores. The vertical axis depicts the fraction of PSLCE takers actually selected to enter form 
1 of a conventional school in 2005. The points depict the fraction of pupils selected into 
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conventional school at each integer distance from the cutoff point. The fitted lines above and below 
the cutoff score are quadratic regressions.12
Two conclusions can be drawn from these graphs. First, the probability of being selected 
into conventional school exhibits a pronounced jump at the cutoff point for both boys and girls. 
Second, the actual selection does not concur one for one with the reconstructed selection, which 
implies that the selection team does not precisely follow the official procedures. If the team had 
precisely followed the procedures, the fraction of pupils selected into conventional school would 
have been 0 at all values below the cutoff point (the negative scores on the horizontal axis) and 1 at 
all values above the cutoff point.
 
13
5.2 PASSING THE SECONDARY SCHOOL EXAM 
 
Figs. 2a and 2b illustrate the impact of selection into a conventional school after completion 
of the 2004 PSLCE on the probability of successfully completing the JCE exam in 2006. The 
horizontal axis again measures the distance of the aggregate 2004 PSLCE score to the 2004 cutoff 
score. The vertical axis measures the fraction of pupils who successfully completed the JCE in 2006 
in the school into which they were selected. 
Fig. 2a displays a clear jump at the cutoff point. Boys whose PSLCE score lies just above the 
cutoff point have a noticeably higher probability of passing the JCE in 2006 than boys whose 
PSLCE score lies just below the cutoff point. Fig. 2b displays a similar, albeit less pronounced, 
discontinuity in the probability of girls passing the JCE in 2006. Overall, figs. 2a and 2b present 
strong evidence of the positive impact of selection into a conventional school on the probability of                                                              
12 Similar figures were used by Lee (2008) and I follow his example. 
13 The difference between the pupils actually selected and those who should have been selected if the selection team had 
precisely applied its own selection procedures might be caused by imprecise technical execution of the procedures. At 
this point I have no evidence for any other explanation. 
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successfully completing the JCE in the school a pupil was selected into two years after taking the 
PSLCE. 
Column 1 of table 3 presents estimates of the positive treatment effect visible in figs 2a and 
2b for both boys and girls. Standard errors are given in parentheses. In accordance with general 
conventions in the RD literature the table displays estimates based on several orders of polynomials 
to investigate the robustness of the estimated treatment effects to misspecification. Following Lee 
and Lemieux (2009), I determine the optimal order of the polynomial based on the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC). 
The results presented in table 3 are in accordance with figs. 2a and 2b. The impact of 
selection into conventional school on the probability of passing the JCE in 2 years is positive and 
significant for boys and girls in all specifications. For boys, depending on the specification used, the 
probability of passing the JCE in 2006 exhibits a jump of 18 to 27 percentage points. For girls, the 
probability exhibits a jump of 21 to 29 percentage points. Overall, the evidence for a positive 
treatment effect of selection into conventional school is strong. For the optimal order of the 
polynomial, the estimated treatment effect equals a roughly 50% higher probability of successfully 
completing the JCE for pupils with a PSLCE score just above the cutoff point. 
5.3 PUPIL RETENTION 
It is of interest to split the discontinuity in the probability of passing the JCE up into two 
components: (i) the probability of participating in the JCE in the school a pupil was selected into 
two years after taking the PSLCE and (ii) the probability of passing the JCE conditional on 
participating in the school a pupil was selected into. I interpret the first component as an indication 
of the extent to which conventional schools do a better job at retaining their pupils. The second 
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component gives an indication of the extent to which selection into a conventional school affects 
pupil learning. 
Figs. 3a and 3b illustrate the impact of selection into conventional school on the first 
component (pupil retention). The vertical axis measures the fraction of pupils retained. Both graphs 
again exhibit a clear jump at the cutoff point. The percentage of pupils retained is visibly higher 
among boys and girls with a PSLCE score right above the cutoff point. 
Column 2 of table 3 confirms these observations. For boys, depending on the specification 
used, the retention rate exhibits a jump of 25 to 29 percentage points. For girls, the retention rate 
exhibits a jump of 28 to 32 percentage points. For the optimal order of the polynomial, the 
estimated treatment effects correspond to a roughly 50% higher retention rate among pupils with a 
PSLCE score just above the cutoff score. 
5.4 PUPIL LEARNING 
At first sight, selection into conventional school does not appear to have an impact on the 
second component, pupil learning. Figs. 4a and 4b do not exhibit a jump in the conditional 
probability of passing the JCE at the cutoff point. Column 3 of table 3 displays a similar ambiguity. 
In all but one of the specifications the standard error is too large to speak of a statistically significant 
jump.  
Based on the presented evidence, it is tempting to conclude that, compared to community 
day schools, conventional schools do a better job at keeping children in school, but not at teaching 
their pupils. This conclusion is valid only if pupils who could not be retained by community day 
schools, but who would have been retained by conventional schools, do not differ from pupils 
retained by community day schools in terms of their conditional passing probability. However, it is 
likely that these pupils actually have a lower conditional passing probability. In fact, this lower 
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conditional passing probability could even be one of the reasons for them to discontinue their 
education. Hence, figs. 4a and 4b, as well as column 3 of table 3, effectively estimate a lower bound 
of the impact of selection into a conventional school on pupil learning.  
It is possible to also estimate an upper bound on the impact of selection into a conventional 
secondary school, based on the assumption that all additional pupils that community day schools 
would have to retain to achieve a pupil retention rate comparable to that of conventional schools 
would fail the exam. Column 4 of table 3 estimates this upper bound. I artificially added pupils to 
the community day school data such that, on average, community day schools and conventional 
schools have the same fraction of participating pupils at the cutoff point. All of the pupils I add 
artificially are classified as failing for the exam, which effectively pushes down the fraction of pupils 
passing the exam conditional on participating in community day schools. The results differ 
drastically from the lower bound. Depending on the order of the polynomial, the number of pupils 
passing the JCE conditional on participating in conventional schools is now 31 to 46 percentage 
points higher for male pupils and 44 to 78 percentage points for female pupils. 
Because I have no further information on pupil backgrounds and capabilities, it is hard to 
say whether the true estimate is closer to the estimated upper or lower bound. The results from the 
bounds analysis suggest that, at worst, conventional schools keep a markedly higher fraction of 
pupils in school without a deterioration in pupil learning. At best, conventional schools manage to 
keep a much higher fraction of pupils in school in combination with a strong improvement in pupil 
learning. 
5.5 HETEROGENEITY 
The results presented thus far represent average treatment effects across a large range of 
cutoff scores. Table 4 provides insight into possible heterogeneity of the treatment effect across 
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cutoff scores. It displays the estimated impact of selection into conventional school on pupil 
retention across 8 ranges of the cutoff scores faced by pupils to be selected into conventional 
schools. The ranges each represent roughly 12.5% of the pupils selected into a public secondary 
school. The column called cutoff range shows that the normalized cutoff scores range from roughly 
minus 2 standard deviations from the mean PSLCE score to almost plus 2 standard deviations from 
the mean PSLCE score for both boys and girls. 
The column titled retention provides the estimated treatment effect for each range. The 
estimated treatment effect appears to be somewhat volatile. However, it is positive over the entire 
range of cutoff scores and, despite the fact that sample sizes are now much smaller than for the 
pooled data, often statistically significant. Overall, the results strongly suggest that the impact of 
selection into conventional school on pupil retention is present over a large range of cutoff points 
and not merely local. 
6. VALIDITY AND ROBUSTNESS 
6.1 VALIDITY 
Lee (2008) showed that, when optimizing agents do not have precise control over the 
forcing variable, the variation in the treatment will be as good as random around the cutoff point. In 
such cases the RD design provides a transparent approach to estimate causal program effects. 
However, ability of agents to precisely manipulate the forcing variable may lead to endogenous 
sorting around the cutoff point and invalidate the RD approach. 
Pupils taking the PSLCE are a prime example of agents who do not have precise control 
over the forcing variable. First, they do not know their own exam score when they are taking the 
exam (i.e. they do not have precise control over the forcing variable). Second, the cutoff point is 
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only determined after all exams have been administered and corrected, so the people correcting the 
exams do not know the cutoff score either. Precise sorting around the cutoff score is, therefore, 
virtually impossible. 
McCrary (2008) proposed to test directly for any manipulation of the forcing variable by 
inspecting the density of the forcing variable for any discontinuities around the cutoff point. In case 
of endogenous sorting, we would expect the density of the forcing variable to be discontinuous 
around the cutoff score: a disproportionately large number of pupils would have a PSLCE score just 
above the cutoff point and vice versa below the cutoff point. 
Figs. 5a and 5b provide an eyeball test of the extent to which pupils sort around the cutoff 
score. They display the density of the distance of the aggregate PSLCE score to the cutoff score. As 
expected, figs 5a and 5b provide no evidence of endogenous sorting. The density is a smooth 
function and does not exhibit a significant jump around the cutoff score.14 15
6.2 ROBUSTNESS 
 
There may be variation in the estimated treatment effect for different subgroups and as a 
result the pooled regressions could mask important underlying disparities in the treatment effect. 
This subsection investigates three important possible sources of heterogeneity in the treatment 
effect. 
                                                             
14 The figures display a Lowess regression rather than a parametric regression and illustrate the importance of choosing 
the correct functional form of the parametric regressions. Approximation of these functions with a linear or quadratic 
function would lead to the conclusion that the density exhibits a significant jump at the cutoff point, simply because a 
linear or quadratic function does not fit the true functional form. 
15 For both boys and girls we do observe a small jump right at the cutoff point. This jump is related to the procedure 
used to regenerate the cutoff points and does not reflect any endogenous sorting. By definition the cutoff point is 
determined by those who have the lowest score to make it into conventional school (i.e. those with the lowest score to 
make it into conventional school serve as a reference point for all other observations). As a result there are pupils with 
this score in every RD group, whereas at other scores some of the RD groups have no observations. As a result there is 
a jump right at the cutoff point. 
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6.2.1. ROBUSTNESS: BOARDING VS. DAY CONVENTIONAL SCHOOL 
The treatment effects estimated in the previous section combine the data for boarding and 
day conventional schools. However, the treatment effects could be more pronounced in one of the 
conventional school types, which could lead to the incorrect conclusion that conventional schools in 
general do a better job at preventing pupils from dropping out or repeating grades. 
Since pupils are selected into boarding conventional school according to merit there is a 
cutoff point for selection into boarding conventional school versus selection into day conventional 
school. Table 5 presents results for the impact of selection into boarding conventional school versus 
day conventional school on retention rates. The estimates do not appear to be robust to changes in 
the order of the polynomial and exhibit large swings. None of the estimated treatment effects is 
statistically significant.16 17
That there is no clear relationship between boarding school and the probability of staying in 
school is also of interest in itself. Boarding schools are an important feature of the education system 
in many Sub-Saharan countries. They are generally considered to be the top notch schools, although 
little is known about their relative performance. The results presented in this paper suggest that 
boarding does not significantly influence pupil performance. 
 
6.2.2. ROBUSTNESS: TUMBUKA NORTHERN REGION VS. REST OF THE COUNTRY 
The north of Malawi is primarily inhabited by the Tumbuka, a Bantu tribe. In Malawi, the 
Tumbuka are renowned for the value they attach to education and for their performance in school.                                                              
16 Other results for the differences between day and boarding conventional school resemble results for differences 
between community day school and conventional school. There is still a pronounced jump in the probability of being 
selected at the cutoff point, whereas there is no jump in the probability of passing the JCE conditional on participating 
in the JCE. I do not present these results, but they are available on request. 
17 The lack of a significant jump at the cutoff point for selection into boarding conventional school is in accordance with 
the hypothesis that the probability of dropping out or repeating grades is to a large extent driven by the educated teacher 
pupil ratio rather than issues unrelated to school quality. As table 2 illustrates, there are no significant differences in the 
educated teacher pupil ratio or the teacher pupil ratio between day and boarding conventional school. Hence, if educated 
teacher pupil ratios play an important role in the probability of dropping out, we should not expect to find a significant 
discontinuity. 
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If there are performance differentials between Tumbuka pupils and other pupils the estimated 
overall treatment effects might not be representative for either Tumbuka pupils or other pupils. 
To investigate this issue, I separately re-estimate the impact of selection into conventional 
school on retention rates for pupils from the north of Malawi and for all other pupils. Column 1 of 
table 6 presents the original pooled estimates, column 2 presents the estimates for pupils from the 
Northern region, and column 3 presents the results for pupils from the other regions. The point 
estimates differ between the two groups, but a Chow test provides no evidence for a statistically 
significant difference between the parameters estimated for the two groups and those estimated 
using the pooled data. There is thus no convincing evidence that the estimated average treatment 
effects are driven by Tumbuka pupils. 
6.2.3. ROBUSTNESS: URBAN VS. RURAL SCHOOLS   
There could be differences in the impact of selection into conventional school on retention 
rates between urban and rural conventional schools. Columns 4 and 5 of table 6 present the 
estimates for pupils selected into urban and rural conventional schools respectively. Both urban and 
rural conventional schools consistently and significantly outperform their community day 
counterparts in terms of pupil retention. The point estimates of the estimated treatment effect, 
however, are consistently higher for pupils selected into urban conventional schools. The Chow test 
confirms that the parameters estimated for the sample of pupils selected into urban conventional 
schools differ significantly from those estimated for the pooled data. Without further investigation it 
is hard to provide a clear explanation for the stronger impact of selection into urban conventional 
school. 
6.2.4. ROBUSTNESS: ERRORS IN FROM 1 SELECTION   
As discussed in section 4, the selection conducted by the selection team does not concur one 
for one with the reconstructed selection. If the pupils who were incorrectly selected into community 
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day school or conventional school do not constitute a random group, their inclusion in the analysis 
may distort the estimated treatment effects. Table 6 column 6 shows the impact of selection into 
conventional school on the probability of taking the JCE using only data for pupils who were 
correctly selected into conventional school. There are some small differences in the point estimates, 
but the Chow test provides no evidence for a statistically significant difference in the parameters. 
7. CONCLUSION 
This paper provides the first evidence on the impact of large scale tracking policies in Sub-
Saharan Africa on school outcomes. The results indicate that a tracking policy in Malawi has a 
substantial impact on pupil retention. Relatively well-endowed conventional secondary schools, 
which accommodate the country’s top pupils, keep roughly 50% more pupils in school than other 
public secondary schools. The strong impact of the tracking policy on pupil retention is not merely a 
local effect, but present across a large range of the pupil ability distribution. Moreover, a bounds 
analysis suggests that pupil learning in conventional schools is at least equal to, but possibly 
markedly higher than in community day schools.  
Robustness checks show that the impact of the tracking procedure is (i) not driven by 
boarding schools, (ii) not likely to be driven by students from one particular tribe, and (iii) more 
pronounced in urban areas. The fact that boarding schools do not improve pupil retention is an 
important finding in itself, as boarding schools form an integral part of secondary education in many 
Sub-Saharan countries. The finding suggests that boarding facilities are not a viable solution to the 
difficulties faced by schools in Sub-Saharan Africa to keep pupils in school. 
The results presented in this paper are relevant for policy makers in Sub-Saharan countries 
that employ tracking policies similar to the one employed in Malawi, or that consider adopting such 
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tracking policies. Although Malawi’s tracking policy positively affects those pupils selected into 
conventional schools, the results do not necessarily imply that overall education outcomes are 
improved by this policy. It may well be the case that a more equal distribution of pupils and 
resources across all secondary schools positively affects pupils in community day schools to the 
extent that nation-wide pupil retention rates actually increase. The presented results should thus not 
be interpreted as a plea in favor of tracking policies. What the results do tell is that tracking policies 
can have a substantial impact on top pupils selected into the elite schools. If policy makers worry 
that spreading limited resources across a large number of schools will render the scarce resources 
ineffective, the effect of concentrating the resources in a smaller number of selective schools can be 
substantial. 
There are two potential explanations for the fact that this paper finds a strong relationship 
between the school environment and school participation, while previous evidence for such a 
relationship is limited. First, this paper studies a comprehensive measure of the school environment, 
including virtually all aspects of peer and school quality. The advantage of this comprehensive 
measure is that it is much more likely to capture any effect of the school environment on pupil 
retention. The obvious disadvantage is that it is impossible to say which components of the school 
environment explain the effect on pupil retention. Further research disentangling these components 
will therefore be highly relevant.  
Second, this paper studies secondary schools rather than primary schools. It is likely that the 
secondary school environment plays a more important role in keeping pupils in school than the 
primary school environment. As pupils grow older and their outside opportunities and obligations 
(such as work, marriage, and children) increase, they will start to evaluate the usefulness of attending 
school more critically. This process may explain why the secondary school environment has such a 
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pronounced impact on pupil retention in Malawi and suggests that a focus on school quality may be 
a valuable complement to more traditional policies that attempt to improve secondary school 
participation (such as conditional cash transfers and reductions in school fees).  
Finally, it is worth emphasizing a potential caveat. While I observe the schools into which 
pupils are selected, I do not observe the schools they actually enter. If pupils are able to circumvent 
the official selection procedures by entering other schools than the ones into which they were 
selected this can affect the results presented in this paper. That being said, I do not have any 
indication of evasion of the official selection procedures by pupils. It also appears implausible for 
the Ministry of Education to maintain this selection procedure, which imposes a substantial 
organizational burden on Malawi’s education sector, if pupils are known to evade the selection on a 
large scale. 
APPENDIX 1: COMBINING INSTITUTIONAL DATA 
A1.1 MATCHING PROCEDURE 
This appendix provides a detailed description of the approximate string matching procedure 
for PSLCE and JCE scores. 
In the first step of this procedure I directly merged the PSLCE data and the JCE data on the 
three identifying variables. This step gave a total of 5,442 successful exact matches on all identifying 
variables out of the initial 39,090 pupils for whom PSLCE and selection information is available. 
In the second step I first split the variable student name for all remaining pupils up into all 
of its constituent names (e.g. the observation "Banda William James" is split up into the three new 
variables "Banda", "William", and "James"). I then directly merged on secondary school, gender and 
all possible combinations of 2 of the constituent names. In other words, in this step I considered an 
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exact mach on secondary school, gender, and two of the constituent names to be a sufficient 
condition to merge. This step gave an additional 8,855 additional matches. 
I did not manually check all additional matches, but I did inspect a sample of 100 of the 
additional matches. In the sample I inspected, the majority of matches did not lead to a match in 
step 1 for the following four reasons: 
1. Different spelling of some of the constituent names; 
2. Different use of abbreviations in some of the constituent names; 
3. Different ordering of the constituent names; 
4. Exclusion of one or more of the constituent names in one of the years. 
In the sample there were 8 pupils for whom one of the constituent names differed across the 
years (e.g. one of the constituent names is Phazani in one year and Rodgers in the next). Two out of 
these 8 students had a different Surname, whereas the remaining pupils had a different given name. 
It is hard to say what the correct approach is to dealing with these problem cases (i.e. those 
for whom one of the constituent names truly differed across the years). Names are a fluid concept in 
Malawi. From personal experience with household and school surveys in Malawi, I know that it is 
not uncommon for pupils to change their names, to be known by multiple given names, or to use 
and adopt different (nick) names over time. Moreover, surnames can change when pupils get 
married or lose their parents. 
I chose to treat an exact match on secondary school, gender, and two of the three 
constituent names as a sufficient condition to merge. An alternative approach could, for example, be 
to drop all problem cases. However, I expect that the latter procedure would drop many legitimate 
matches and relatively few incorrect matches. 
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In the third step I used approximate string matching to match observations for which no 
exact match of names came up in steps 1 and 2 on secondary school, gender, and name. The 
software I used (called reclink) was written for Stata by Michael Blasnik 18
The matching algorithm provides a match score that indicates how closely two observations 
match on a scale from 0 to 1. By default, the program discards all matches with a match score below 
0.6 and I maintained this default. I manually checked all matches. In this step, as in step 2, I 
considered a close match on two constituent names to be a minimum requirement. I discarded all 
combinations based on less than two close matches. 
 and "combines 
approximate string comparators and probabilistic matching algorithms to identify the best matches 
and assess their reliability". 
Manually checking matches is a tedious and somewhat arbitrary job. In the process I may 
have discarded some matches that others would not have discarded and vice versa. However, in the 
vast majority of cases the success of the matching algorithm is fairly easily determined and not 
controversial. Just to give an example, most people would agree that the names "Lazalo Christina 
Daisoni" and "Dayisoni Christina L" constitute a reasonable match, whereas the names "Genda Eric 
Henry" and "Banda Henry C" do not. 
After manually discarding 513 mismatches, step 3 gave an additional 4,930 matches. 
I did not match to the remaining pupils, although some of them will have taken the JCE in a 
school other than the one they were selected into. The reason for this decision is that, because the 
                                                             
18 Blasnik, M. (2007). Reclink: Stata module to probabilistically match records. EconPapers software: 
http://econpapers.repec.org/software/bocbocode/s456876.htm. 
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number of names to be matched is large, it is virtually impossible to tell whether a close match in 
terms of names really does constitute a legitimate match. 
A1.2 SUCCESS OF THE MATCHING PROCEDURE 
According to the EMIS, only about 60% of the pupils who entered public secondary school 
in 2005 should show up in the 2006 JCE records for the school that they had been selected into. 
The remaining pupils should not show up for the following reasons: 15% of them drop out in Form 
1, 1% repeat Form 1, 5% transfer to another school during Form 1, 13% drop out in form 2, 7% 
repeat Form 2, 3% transfer to another school during Form 2. 
There will also be a group of pupils who do not show up in the 2006 JCE records, because 
they never enter the public secondary school they had been selected into. Some of them will be 
pupils who decided never to attend secondary school, regardless of their selection into a public 
secondary school. Others will be pupils who transferred to another secondary school before the start 
of Form 1. Finally, there will be pupils do not show up in the 2006 JCE records because they 
registered for the 2006 JCE under a completely new name. 
Although I cannot provide exact percentages for the latter 3 reasons (because they are not 
part of the EMIS data), it seems unlikely that much more than 50% of the pupils selected to attend 
Form 1 in community day school or conventional school in 2005 will show up in the 2006 JCE 
records. Indeed, the matching procedure matched the 2004 PSLCE score to the 2006 JCE score for 
49% (19,227 out of 39,090) of these pupils. The selection procedure thus appears to have been 
successful. Depending on the percentages for the latter 3 reasons, the success rate is at least 82%, 
but probably close to 100%. 
APPENDIX 2: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SELECTION PROCEDURES 
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A2.1 TIE-BREAKING PSLCE SCORES 
    Because entry quotas for school types are fixed they implicitly determine the PSLCE 
cutoff points. There may be cases where only a fraction of pupils at the cutoff point can be selected. 
As an example, consider the 2005 national boarding school selection. A total of 718 boys were to be 
selected into national boarding school and the resulting cutoff point in the aggregate PSLCE score 
was 268. Because the top 716 to 766 male pupils all had an aggregate PSLCE score of 268 only 3 of 
the pupils at the cutoff point could be selected. 
    The selection team deals with this issue by ranking all pupils with an aggregate PSLCE 
score equivalent to the cutoff score in ascending alphabetical order. The pupils are then selected 
according to this order until the quota is reached, which implies that those with a name that starts 
with a letter early in the alphabet have a slightly higher chance of being selected. In the regression 
discontinuity literature designs where treatment is randomly assigned at the cutoff point are generally 
referred to as tie-breaking experiments. 
A2.2 WHAT IF SELECTED PUPILS DO NOT ENROLL 
Some of the pupils who were selected into a government secondary school will, for a range 
of reasons, decide not to attend the school they have been selected into. The MOE follows a 
straightforward procedure to deal with this issue. When a place is freed up in one level the top 
ranked pupil from the level below is pushed up a level. There is a waiting list for Community Day 
Secondary Schools, so pupils who were originally not selected into any government secondary 
school can attend Community Day Secondary School if places are freed up. 
A2.3 SWITCHING BETWEEN SCHOOLS OF THE SAME LEVEL 
It is, in principle, possible for pupils to apply for a transfer to another school within the 
same level. Pupils can hand in a request to be transferred to another school of the same level at the 
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Division Education Office. The officer in charge will pass the request on to the school the pupil 
wants to transfer to. The school under consideration then lets the Division Education Office know 
if they have space for this additional pupil. 
A2.4 SWITCHING BETWEEN SCHOOLS OF A DIFFERENT LEVEL 
    For a variety of reasons, some of the students will attempt to transfer to a school of a 
lower level. Applying to a school of a lower level is discouraged by the District Education Offices. 
However, if a pupil insists on switching to a school of a lower level the Division Education Office 
has the ability to permit the transfer. 
Some pupils who have been selected into District or National boarding school will apply for 
a transfer to a lower level school (e.g. a non-boarding school), because they cannot afford to pay the 
boarding fees. Some bursaries are available for these students through the secondary school bursary 
scheme (formerly known as GABLE).19
There are also pupils who will attempt to be accepted into a school of a higher level. The 
Division Education Office has some discretion to grant such requests if students provide compelling 
reasons for the transfer. Compelling reasons can, for instance, be physical disabilities that hamper a 
pupil's performance in the PSLCE. 
 Nevertheless the District Education Office will sometimes 
have to grant the request to be selected into a lower education level. 
  
                                                             
19 For additional information refer to http://www.sdnp.org.mw/edu/fees-edu-sec.html. 
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TABLES 
Table 1: School size, physical resources, and human resources in community day schools and conventional secondary schools 
                            
 
CDSS 
   
CSS         
  
 
N Mean SE 
 
N Mean SE 
 
T-Stat 
              School size (number of pupils) 
 
453 178 4.7 
 
113 460 26.3 
 
-10.55 *** 
             Income 
           Annual school fees per student in US Dollar 
 
453 25 12.2 
 
113 64 39.7 
 
-0.96 
 Annual school income per student in US Dollar 
 
453 97 25.3 
 
113 160 63.8 
 
-0.92 
              Human Resources 
           Teachers per 100 pupils 
 
453 5.6 0.1 
 
113 4.4 0.1 
 
7.33 *** 
Educated teachers per 100 pupils 
 
453 0.8 0.1 
 
113 4.0 0.1 
 
-22.89 *** 
Non-teaching staff per 100 pupils 
 
453 0.9 0.1 
 
113 2.6 0.2 
 
-9.61 *** 
             Physical Resources 
           Percentage of schools with a library 
 
454 35 2.2 
 
113 88 3.0 
 
-14.30 *** 
Percentage of schools with a PC room 
 
454 4 0.9 
 
113 47 4.7 
 
-8.88 *** 
Percentage of schools with toilets 
 
454 4 0.9 
 
113 79 3.9 
 
-19.00 *** 
Percentage of schools with water from tap or borehole 
 
453 78 1.6 
 
113 89 2.4 
 
-3.63 *** 
Percentage of schools with electricity 
 
453 22 1.8 
 
113 82 3.2 
 
-16.31 *** 
Classrooms per 100 pupils 
 
453 2.91 0.09 
 
113 2.36 0.11 
 
4.00 *** 
Book to pupil ratio (Chichewa) 
 
425 0.49 0.03 
 
101 0.82 0.11 
 
-2.88 ** 
Book to pupil ratio (English) 
 
425 0.54 0.02 
 
101 1.11 0.14 
 
-4.13 *** 
Book to pupil ratio (mathematics) 
 
425 0.47 0.03 
 
101 1.08 0.14 
 
-4.25 *** 
                                                Source: EMIS 2005 and EMIS 2006. Schools included are those for which the Ministry of Education selected the 2005 Form 1 pupils. Numbers are averaged over the 
years 2005 and 2006. Annual income per student in US Dollar calculated using an exchange rate of 140 Malawi Kwacha per US Dollar. Educated teachers are those 
teachers with a degree beyond the MSCE. Significance levels provided for H0: μ(CDSS)-μ(CSS)=0, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2: School size, physical resources, and human resources in day and boarding conventional schools 
                            Day CSS 
 
Boarding CSS 
       N Mean SE 
 
N Mean SE 
 
T-Stat 
               School size (number of pupils)   49 409 37.1 
 
64 499 36.2 
 
-1.75 * 
              Income   
          Annual school fees per student in US Dollar   49 18 14.3 
 
64 100 69.5 
 
-1.16 
 Annual school income per student in US Dollar   49 68 29.2 
 
64 230 110.0 
 
-1.42 
               Human Resources   
          Teachers per 100 pupils   49 4.5 0.2 
 
64 4.3 0.1 
 
0.83 
 Educated teachers per 100 pupils   49 4.0 0.2 
 
64 4.0 0.1 
 
-0.14 
 Non-teaching staff per 100 pupils   44 2.0 0.2 
 
57 3.0 0.2 
 
-3.41 *** 
              Physical Resources   
          Percentage of schools with a library   49 82 5.6 
 
64 94 3.0 
 
-1.90 * 
Percentage of schools with a PC room   49 31 6.7 
 
64 59 6.2 
 
-3.17 *** 
Percentage of schools with toilets   49 63 7.0 
 
64 91 3.7 
 
-3.48 *** 
Percentage of schools with water from tap or borehole   49 90 3.9 
 
64 88 3.1 
 
0.31 
 Percentage of schools with electricity   49 74 5.9 
 
64 88 3.3 
 
-1.93 * 
Classrooms per 100 pupils   49 2.73 0.20 
 
64 2.08 0.09 
 
2.90 *** 
Book to pupil ratio (Chichewa)   44 1.26 0.23 
 
57 0.49 0.07 
 
3.29 *** 
Book to pupil ratio (English)   44 1.54 0.26 
 
57 0.78 0.11 
 
2.63 ** 
Book to pupil ratio (mathematics)   44 1.36 0.24 
 
57 0.86 0.17 
 
1.77 * 
                                                Source: EMIS 2005 and EMIS 2006. Schools included are those for which the Ministry of Education selected the 2005 Form 1 pupils. Numbers are averaged over the 
years 2005 and 2006. Annual income per student in US Dollar calculated using an exchange rate of 140 Malawi Kwacha per US Dollar. Educated teachers are those 
teachers with a degree beyond the MSCE. Significance levels provided for H0: μ(day)-μ(boarding)=0, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3: Impact of selection into a conventional secondary school 
                          
Order of 
 Polynomial   Passing JCE 
 
Pupil 
Retention 
 
Pupil 
learning 
 
Pupil Learning, 
upper bound 
              Male pupils   
           1st order   0.18 *** 
 
0.25 *** AIC -0.09 *** 
 
0.31 *** 
    (0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
 2nd order   0.27 *** AIC 0.28 *** 
 
0.02 
  
0.42 *** AIC 
    (0.03) 
  
(0.03) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
 3rd order   0.27 *** 
 
0.29 *** 
 
0.02 AIC 
 
0.46 *** 
    (0.03) 
  
(0.03) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.03) 
 Observations   21131 
  
21131 
  
11654 
  
15359 
                Female pupils   
           1st order   0.21 *** 
 
0.28 *** AIC -0.03 
  
0.44 *** 
    (0.03) 
  
(0.03) 
  
(0.03) 
  
(0.03) 
 2nd order   0.26 *** 
 
0.31 *** 
 
0.04 
  
0.61 *** 
    (0.03) 
  
(0.04) 
  
(0.04) 
  
(0.06) 
 3rd order   0.29 *** AIC 0.32 *** 
 
0.04 AIC 
 
0.78 *** AIC 
    (0.04) 
  
(0.04) 
  
(0.04) 
  
(0.10) 
 Observations   17536 
  
17536 
  
8480 
  
12276 
                                                     Source: MANEB and Ministry of Education selection data. Two-stage least squares estimates of the effect of selection 
into a conventional school on the fraction of pupils passing the JCE in 2006 in the school into which they were selected, 
on the fraction of pupils retained, and on pupil performance (i.e. the fraction of pupils of passing the JCE conditional on 
participating in the school they were selected into). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by secondary school. 
AIC = optimal order of polynomial in second stage regression according to the Akaike information criterion. Dummies 
for regression discontinuity groups were included in the estimation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 4.  
                      Group 
 
Observations 
 
Cutoff range 
 
Retention 
 
SE 
           Male pupils 
        1 
 
2559 
 
-2.14 - -0.04 
 
0.14 
 
0.09 
2 
 
2563 
 
0.01 - 0.42 
 
0.27 
 
0.06 
3 
 
2445 
 
0.52 - 0.73 
 
0.32 
 
0.06 
4 
 
2445 
 
0.75 - 0.83 
 
0.13 
 
0.15 
5 
 
2249 
 
0.85 - 0.91 
 
0.36 
 
0.07 
6 
 
3411 
 
0.93 - 0.96 
 
0.25 
 
0.07 
7 
 
2738 
 
1.01 - 1.11 
 
0.30 
 
0.05 
8 
 
2721 
 
1.21 - 1.80 
 
0.16 
 
0.06 
           Female pupils 
        1 
 
2112 
 
-1.92 - -0.09 
 
0.17 
 
0.10 
2 
 
2232 
 
-0.01 - 0.51 
 
0.26 
 
0.09 
3 
 
2101 
 
0.61 - 0.72 
 
0.23 
 
0.05 
4 
 
2084 
 
0.80 - 0.93 
 
0.36 
 
0.08 
5 
 
1670 
 
0.95 - 1.06 
 
0.07 
 
0.14 
6 
 
2413 
 
1.11 - 1.21 
 
0.31 
 
0.09 
7 
 
2550 
 
1.24 - 1.35 
 
0.18 
 
0.10 
8 
 
2374 
 
1.40 - 1.92 
 
0.28 
 
0.06 
                                            Source: MANEB and Ministry of Education selection data. Two-stage least squares estimates of the effect of selection 
into CSS on pupil retention for 8 ranges of the data representing roughly 12.5% of the pupils taking the PSLCE each. 
Cutoff ranges are normalized vis-à-vis the aggregate PSLCE scores of pupils selected into public secondary schools. 
Regressions contain first order polynomial terms of difference between PSLCE score and cutoff. Standard errors are 
clustered by secondary school. Dummies for regression discontinuity groups were included in the estimation. 
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Table 5 
        
Order of 
Polynomial 
 
Taking JCE 
inBoarding 
CSS 
    Male pupils 
   1st order 
 
-0.10 AIC 
  
(0.11) 
 2nd order 
 
-0.54 
 
  
(0.36) 
 3rd order 
 
-1.36 
 
  
(1.03) 
 Observations 
 
3,753 
     Female pupils 
   1st order 
 
-0.13 AIC 
  
(0.34) 
 2nd order 
 
1.95 
 
  
(2.39) 
 3rd order 
 
0.64 
 
  
(0.67) 
 Observations 
 
3443 
                 Source: MANEB and Ministry of Education selection data. Two-stage least squares estimates of the effect of selection 
into boarding CSS vs day CSS on the fraction of pupils retained. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by 
secondary school. AIC = optimal order of polynomial in second stage regression according to the Akaike information 
criterion. Dummies for regression discontinuity groups were included in the estimation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6.  
                                      Order of Polynomial   Pooled   Northern Region   Other Regions   Urban   Rural   Correct Selection 
                                      Male pupils                                 
 
  
1st order   0.25 *** AIC 0.26 ***   0.25 ***  AIC 0.32 *** †   0.24 *** AIC 0.24 *** 
    (0.02)     (0.08)     (0.02)     (0.08)     (0.02)     (0.02)   
2nd order   0.28 ***   0.31 ***   0.28 ***   0.35 *** †   0.28 ***   0.28 *** AIC 
    (0.03)     (0.1)     (0.03)     (0.09)     (0.03)     (0.03)   
3rd order   0.29 ***   0.23 ** AIC 0.29 ***   0.35 *** † AIC 0.28 ***   0.27 *** 
    (0.03)     (0.12)     (0.03)     (0.1)     (0.03)     (0.03)   
Observations   21131   4316     16815     2121     18703     20678   
                                      Female pupils                                     
1st order   0.28 *** AIC 0.21 *** AIC 0.29 ***   0.39 *** ‡ AIC 0.23 *** AIC 0.28 *** 
    (0.03)     (0.08)     (0.03)     (0.08)     (0.03)     (0.03)   
2nd order   0.31 ***   0.32 **   0.31 *** AIC 0.45 *** ‡   0.29 ***   0.29 *** AIC 
    (0.04)     (0.13)     (0.03)     (0.08)     (0.04)     (0.03)   
3rd order   0.32 ***   0.39 *   0.33 ***   0.46 *** ‡   0.29 ***   0.29 *** 
    (0.04)     (0.23)     (0.04)     (0.09)     (0.04)     (0.04)   
Observations   17536   3686     13850     2339     14947     16877   
                                                                            Source: MANEB and Ministry of Education selection data. Two-stage least squares estimates of the effect of selection into CSS on the fraction of pupils retained (in 
the school they were selected into). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by secondary school. AIC = optimal order of polynomial in second stage regression 
according to the Akaike information criterion. Dummies for regresion discontinuity groups were included in the estimation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ‡ 
Estimate differs from pooled estimate at p<0.01 based on Chow forecast test, † estimate differs at p<0.05. 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1a: Fraction of boys selected to enter Form1 in a conventional school in 2005 as a function of 
the difference between their 2004 PSLCE score and the 2004 conventional school cutoff score. 
 
Figure 1b: Fraction of girls selected to enter Form1 in a conventional school in 2005 as a function of 
the difference between their 2004 PSLCE score and the 2004 conventional school cutoff score. 
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Figure 2a: Fraction of boys passing the JCE in 2006 in the school they had been selected into as a 
function of the difference between their 2004 PSLCE score and the 2004 cutoff score. 
 
 
Figure 2b: Fraction of girls passing the JCE in 2006 in the school they had been selected into as a 
function of the difference between their 2004 PSLCE score and the 2004 cutoff score. 
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Figure 3a: Fraction of boys retained as a function of the difference between their 2004 PSLCE score 
and the 2004 cutoff score. 
 
 
Figure 3b: Fraction of girls retained as a function of the difference between their 2004 PSLCE score 
and the 2004 cutoff score. 
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Figure 4b: Fraction of boys passing the JCE in 2006 conditional on actually taking the JCE in 2006 
in the school they had been selected into as a function of the difference between their 2004 PSLCE 
score and the 2004 cutoff score. 
 
Figure 4b: Fraction of girls passing the JCE in 2006 conditional on actually taking the JCE in 2006 in 
the school they had been selected into as a function of the difference between their 2004 PSLCE 
score and the 2004 cutoff score. 
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Figure 5a: Density of the difference between the 2004 PSLCE score of male pupils and the 2004 
conventional school cutoff score. 
 
 
Figure 5b: Density of the difference between the 2004 PSLCE score of female pupils and the 2004 
conventional school cutoff score. 
 
